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Introduction  
In 1870, Sweden's per capita income was lass than half of Britain's, and well below the 
average of Northern and Western Europe. Over three-quarters of the population eked out a 
meagre existence from semi-arctic agriculture. Rapid population growth put severe pressure 
on the carrying capacity of the land, and large parts of the country were subject to massive 
forestation and environmental degradation. Between 1850 and 1910, over one million Swedes, out of a population of around four million at that time, emigrated, mainly to North 
America, in search of a better life.  
Today, Sweden is one of the richest countries in the world. In terms of human development, 
UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) gave Sweden a respectable fourth place in the 
1991 Human Development Report (HDR). In the gender-disparity-adjusted HDI of the HDR of 
1992, Sweden improved its rank to number one in the world.  
The main purpose of this country study is to summarise the major reasons for this 
spectacular and sustained success in economic and social development, and to discuss, as a 
background paper for the 1996 Human development Report, the inter-linkages between 
macroeconomic development, political and institutional development and human 
development. Since the early process of industrialisation and modernisation may be of some 
general relevance, the historical part is given considerable attention.  
By and large, the period 1870-1970 can be regarded as an almost uninterrupted success story. 
However, the expression "the Swedish Model", occasionally used in this paper, basically 
refers to the period between the late 1903s and the early 1970s. During this period, Swedish 
society did exhibit certain rather unique features. In the last two decades, Sweden has lost 
her uniqueness; a number of countries have reached, or passed, Sweden's per capita income, 
and Sweden's welfare system today contains few features which cannot be found in many 
other countries. What remains as unique is the highest tax burden in the world.  
Sweden's entry, in January 1995, into the European Union is likely to reduce the differences 
between Sweden and other EU members further.  
Lack of economic growth has also served to erode the welfare system in recent years. During 
the last two decades, economic growth has been sluggish, and since 1991, a severe economic 
recession has hit the country. Per capita income has declined for several consecutive years, 
and is today lower than the average for the European Union. Unemployment has reached its 
highest level in sixty years. The traditional welfare system is being seriously questioned and 
transformed, and new solutions to new problems are being sought.  
The indicators of human development used by UNDP in the HDI calculations - such as life 
expectancy, adult literacy, and infant mortality - are, of course, largely unaffected even by a 
deep recession in one of the richest countries in the world, although progress in other 
countries has made Sweden slide down on the global HDI ranking. There are, however, 
other "softer" indicators of human development that are less resilient to crisis. In a 
concluding section, an attempt will be made to use certain non-conventional human 
development indicators to illustrate the relationship between negative growth, increasing 
inequality and deteriorating human development in a highly developed industrialised country 
like Sweden.  
   
Part I. Historical Background: Sweden 1870 - 1960    
1. 1870 - 1930: Export-led industrialisation and transition to democracy  
While historians normally take the 1870s as the starting point for Sweden's industrialisation 
and economic transformation, important changes were underway much earlier, especially 
within the agricultural sector
2. One crucial prerequisite for these changes was the enactment 
of various enclosure laws that shifted land into more homogenous plots. Before the reforms, 
each farmer would possess many different plots of land, often situated at long distances 
from each other. While these reforms served to establish stricter property rights, putting an 
end to insecure and disputed tenancy and open access systems for cattle raising, they 
aggravated the employment problem for landless agricultural workers. The number of 
people wanting to leave the countryside, and even the country, therefore increased, as did 
the supply of labour in non-agricultural sectors. From a short-term perspective, landless or 
semi-landless peasants and agricultural workers were the main losers of the enclosure laws, 
while small and medium-sized family farmers - who constituted the very backbone of 
Swedish agriculture - were the winners.  
An important consequence was that the land tenure reforms encouraged more intensive 
production techniques, and rising productivity in agriculture. In fact, progress was so rapid 
that Sweden developed into a large net exporter of grain between the 1850s and 1880s.  
Another factor which helped to lay the foundation for the rapid economic growth of the last 
decades of the 19
th century, was the gradual development of a financial system, with 
commercial banks being relatively well developed already by the mid-19
th century.  
Helped by declining transport costs and by the booming construction industry in England, 
timber and wood products also developed into important export products beginning in the 
mid 19
th century. The forestry sector thereby supplemented Sweden's traditionally heavy 
reliance upon iron ore exports.  
During the entire period, Sweden's terms of trade developed favourably.  
The export sector remained the "engine of growth" until the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Technological innovations greatly helped to reduce costs, and diversify production. 
Domestic manufacturing based on iron, timber and other Swedish raw materials developed 
rapidly, thereby increasing employment and value added in the export sector (unemployment 
remained high until the 1910s, however). For example, the development of the paper and 
pulp industry demanded a more advanced technology, and more labour power, than the 
simple timber and sawmill products that were exported earlier. Similar development took 
place in the mineral sector; instead of exporting iron ore, Swedish exports of steel products 
expanded rapidly.  
Trade policies became increasingly outward-oriented. Import deregulation and trade 
liberalisation was initiated in the 1840s and 1850s, and further steps were taken in the 1860s, 
with free trade at its peak. The trade policies pursued by Sweden and her major trading 
partners provided strong incentives to a dynamic development of both exports and imports, although a protectionist wave reached Sweden and the rest of Europe in the 1880s and 
1890s.  
During the entire period, between 1873 and until World War I, the Swedish authorities 
adhered to the gold standard, and the Swedish currency was pegged to major international 
currencies with a fixed exchange rate. Naturally, this provided Swedish traders with a unique 
stability as regards the exchange rate regime.  
A class of highly successful industrial entrepreneurs developed, and rising real incomes on 
the domestic market supplemented the traditional reliance upon exports. Unlike many of 
today's developing countries, Sweden can be said to have pursued a development strategy 
based on successful export promotion followed by import substitution.  
While Sweden managed to stay out of World War I, demand for Swedish exports remained 
strong. A number of products based on domestic technological innovations - such as ball 
bearings, matches, telephones, vacuum cleaners, and others - were highly successful on the 
world market. Not surprisingly, Swedish producers of gunpowder, dynamite and arms also 
profited.  
A striking feature of Sweden's export-led development between 1870 and 1930 is the fact 
that the lion's share of the revenue was invested domestically. This was done either by the 
exporters themselves, or by the state, which through the tax system managed to appropriate 
the rents from profitable exports.  
The fact that Sweden all through the 19
th century had developed a tradition of a 
comparatively competent and honest civil service, with high prestige and salaries, 
contributed to create a constructive atmosphere between the state and the emerging class of 
entrepreneurs. Corruption appears to have been quite limited, and cooperation between the 
public administration and industry was regarded as something completely natural.  
The capital generated by the booming export sector was complemented by large-scale 
international borrowing before and around the turn of the century. Capital import exceeded, 
on average, three percent of GDP between 1870-1910. While interest payments on the 
foreign debt often amounted to 10 percent of exports during this period, the payment 
capacity was never in danger, and Sweden therefor never suffered from a "debt crisis". Most 
of the capital that was imported was used to finance directly and indirectly productive 
investments, not least in physical and social infrastructure.  
The danger of a debt crisis was also reduced by a series of fortunate circumstances which 
enabled Sweden to repay most of its foreign debt accumulated between 1880 and 1913 
during and after World War I, at inflationary prices in depreciated currencies.  
The overall and sectoral growth of the Swedish economy during this period is shown in table 
I.1. The figures are far from spectacular; what is most striking is rather the fact that the rate 
of growth was stable, and sustained, over such a long period of time.  
   Table I.1 Sectoral Growth of Production in Sweden 1870-1930. Annual averages.    
   
   
Sector  1870-90  1890-1910  1910-1930
Manufacturing  3.6 5.6  4.0
Agriculture  1.5 1.4  0.7
Construction  2.1 1.4  3.5
Trade   2.4 3.3  3.4
Transport  5.9 5.5  4.3
Housing services  1.1 1.3  1.3
Public administration  1.6  1.3  1.3
Total  2.1 3.1  3.1
Source: Krantz and Nilsson, Swedish National Product 1861-1970 (1975), quoted by Södersten (1991), p. 18  
   
Human development  
While human development lagged behind the high rate of economic growth in the last 
decades of the 19
th century, substantial progress was made in many areas (see Tables I.2 and 
I.3 below). Various health indicators reveal a steady improvement, as did the general level of 
education. Already in 1842, legislation about mandatory primary education ("folkskola") was 
promulgated, thereby replacing older legislation from 1686 which had given the Church the 
sole responsibility for giving Christian education to all Swedish children. While the coverage 
of primary schools was far from complete in all parts of the country, there are many 
indicators showing that the vast majority of Swedish children did learn to read and write as 
early as in the 1840s. Already before that, the Church had made a substantial contribution to 
the reduction of illiteracy even among the poorer strata of the population.  
The expansion of Swedish primary education between 1850 and 1900 is illustrated in Table 
I.2. below.  
   
Table I.2. Number of primary school pupils and teachers in 1850 and 1900.    
   
   
   1850  1870  1900
Number of pupils  270,000 556,000  690,000
Number of teachers  3,500  7,800  13,500
Pupils/teacher  77 71  51
Source: 1850: Nationalencyklopedin, Vol. 6, p. 485. 1870 and 1900: Johansson, Egil (1972).     
The amazing development of literacy in Sweden in the middle of the 19
th century is shown in 
Table I.3.  
   
Table I.3. Reading Capability, percent of Swedish Adult Population 1845-1900.      
   
   
Year  Reading Capability, % 
1845  60.8 
1852  81.5 
1862  97.4 
1875  99.0 
1895  99.9 
Source: Egil Johansson (1977). Data from 1875 and 1895 are based on reading capacity of male recruits to the 
(obligatory) military service.  
   
Technical education also expanded rapidly. Two technological universities were established 
in the late 19
th century, and the number of Swedish civil engineers was around 3,500 in 1914. 
The number of students in technical vocational schools increased from 2,000 in 1870 to over 
10,000 in 1910 (Myhrman, 1994, p.87).  
While iron ore and timber often get most of the credit for Sweden’s rapid economic 
development in the late 19th and early 20th century, the introduction of obligatory primary 
education a few decades earlier, and consistent efforts to expand the number and quality of 
vocational schools and higher education, may deserve at least as much credit. Despite 
widespread poverty and deprivation, the Swedish people’s overall level of education was, in 
the late 19th century, appreciably better than in most other parts of Europe.  
The development of certain human development indicators in 1870-1930 is shown below.  
   
Table I.4. Human Development Indicators in Sweden 1870-1930    
   
   
  1861-70 1891-19001921-
30
Annual rate of population growth  0.76 0.71 0.39Birth rate (per 1,000)  31.40 27.1417.51
Death rate (per 1,000)  20.16  16.3612.07
Infant mortality (0-1 a year) per 1,000 live births   139 102 59
Life expectancy at birth               
  Males      43 51 61 
  Females  46 54 63
Adult literacy rate, % of adult population  98 99.9  99.9
Sources: Demographic data: National Central Bureau of Statistics, Historical Statistics of Sweden, Part 1, 
Population 1720-1967, Stockholm 1969, and (literacy) Egil Johansson (1977).  
   
Political developments  
The transition from monarchy and semi-parlamentarism to parliamentary democracy with 
only a symbolic role for the royal family was a gradual process. IN 1907, universal and equal 
franchise for the Second Chamber of Parliament ("Riksdagen") was introduced, as well as a 
certain democratisation of the First Chamber, still dominated by the aristocracy. In 1921, the 
transition to full parliamentary democracy was completed, as both the King and the First 
Chamber of Parliament were forced to accept woman suffrage and universal and equal 
franchise for elections to both chambers, and in local elections.  
The first genuinely free elections, in 1921, were won by the Social Democratic Party, 
founded in 1889, which formed a minority government lasting until 1926.  
   
2. 1930-1960. The crisis of the 1930s and the growth and consolidation of the welfare 
state  
The Great depression and its aftermath  
Like most other countries, Sweden suffered severely during the Great depression of the 
1930s. Unemployment, which was around 12 percent in 1930, roes to 34 percent in 1934, 
which in combination with reductions in wages caused a series of strikes and other social 
conflicts.  
The general elections of 1932 resulted in a victory for the Social Democratic Party, and, to 
some extent, for the Farmers’ Party. The new Social Democratic government offered a 
comprehensive package of measures, including massive public works and extensive state 
support to the crisis-ridden agricultural sector, to fight the crisis. After an agreement was 
reached with the Farmers’ Party, the policy was implemented as from 1933.  
Partly as a result of the crisis policy, and of a fortunate depreciation of the Swedish Krona 
initiated in 1931 when Sweden decided to leave the gold standard, Sweden was able to 
overcome the economic downturn more rapidly than most other countries. In 1935, the 
volume of Swedish exports exceeded its pre-depression level, and by 1936, both real wages 
and the level of production had done the same. By the end of the decade, unemployment had become insignificant. The golden age of the "Swedish Model", with several decades 
marked by low unemployment, Social Democratic political hegemony and consolidation of 
the welfare system, had begun.    
The 1930s can be seen as a decade of preparation for the coming welfare state, with the 
Social Democrats preparing a large number of radical bills for social reform. The Social 
Democrats’ political programme also included an enhanced role for the state in the 
regulation of the economy, and nationalisation of key enterprises, including the large 
commercial banks. Although the Great Depression, and later rising military expenditures and 
the Second World War, forced the government to postpone many of the social and 
economic reforms, the foundation was laid for the "Swedish Model", and the post-war 
period witnessed the adoption of comprehensive welfare legislation concerning, among 
other things, old-age pensions, child allowances, rent allowances and subsidised housing, 
education reforms, and a health insurance programme.    
Partly as a result of remaining wartime regulations, the post-war period was also 
characterised by selective state controls and interventions in key areas, such as the housing 
sector (with a rent control partly in force even today), interest rate and credit controls, and 
foreign exchange restrictions. Price controls, gradually dismantled during the coming 
decades, were also prevalent.  
Most of the Social Democrats’ proposals for a drastic change in the "rules of the game" of 
the economy - such as a nationalisation of the large commercial banks, and of a number of 
other key enterprises - were, however, never implemented. Swedish banks and industries 
thus remained predominantly privately owned, and nationalisation programmes have never 
since come back to the Social Democratic political programme.    
   
The Post-war boom    
Since Sweden managed to remain neutral also during World War II, with the entire industry 
and infrastructure intact, the Swedish economy was well equipped to profit from the post-
war international recovery. Unlike the situation after World War I, no international recession 
followed upon the peace in 1945, and demand for Swedish export products was exceedingly 
strong. The Korean War in the early 1950s gave further stimulus to Swedish exports, while at 
the same time giving rise to a temporary surge of inflation, hitherto very low.    
While traditional export products like iron ore and timber remained important, the earlier 
tendency towards more skill-intensive industrial processing based on domestic raw materials 
accelerated. Engineering products - not least from a couple of rapidly expanding automobile 
industries - increased their share of total exports to over 40 percent by the early 1960s.  
Despite declining agricultural production, the 1950s witnessed rapid economic growth. In 
addition to manufactured exports, various domestic sectors, such as public administration, 
housing services and trade and transportation, showed dynamic growth.    
   Table I.5. Sectoral Growth of Production in Sweden 1930-1960. Annual averages.      
   
Sector  1930-50  1950-60
Manufacturing  3.8 3.9
Agriculture  1.1  -0.4
Construction  2.5 2.3
Trade  1.5 3.7
Transport  3.8 3.9
Housing services  2.1 5.7
Public administration  3.0 3.5
Total  2.6 3.4
Source: Various official sources, quoted in Södersten (1991), p. 18.    
What is striking, again, is the stability of the Swedish success story. Decade after decade 
since the 1870s, the economy grew by two to three percent per year; in the 1950s even 
slightly faster. The key factor was, of course, rising productivity; from 1870 to 1970, Swedish 
output per man-hour rose seventeen-fold, the highest growth rate among sixteen OECD 
data for which comparable data are available (Table 1.6).    
   
Table I.6. Annual Growth in GDP per Man-Hour 1870-1970.      
   
   1870-1970 1870-1913 1913-1950  1950-1970
Sweden  2.89 2.32 2.84  4.20
OECD average    
(unweighted) 
2.26 1.64 1.82  4.46
Source: Davis & Henrekson (1995), based on Maddison (1982).  
   
Behind this development lie a number of factors, some of which have been touched upon 
earlier, e.g.:  
- a comparatively high level of general education;  
- good export markets and good luck with international demand; rapid technological 
progress and a series of successful innovations;  
- the rise and consolidation of a production-oriented class of entrepreneurs;  
- neutrality during two world wars;  
- a crisis policy during the 1930s which helped to reduce the impact and duration of the 
recession.    
All this was important. Still, perhaps even more important was the socio-political and 
institutional development, in a broad sense, which helped to underpin the sustained economic growth that took place. But before situating the discussion in a Swedish historical 
perspective, a few words may be said about the role of institutions in economic growth.    
   
Inter-linkages between economic growth, institutions and social capital.  
While the complex nature of the many different factors behind economic development 
remains poorly understood, the early emphasis on physical capital formation has, in modern 
growth theory, been replaced by a number of variables which have one thing in common: 
they are more related to "software" factors, at the expense of machinery and equipment. In 
particular, human skills have emerged as perhaps most important factor of production. It 
thus appears as if indicators such as primary school enrollment, literacy, etc. are robustly 
correlated to economic growth. The gender aspect of education also appears highly relevant 
in this context; in countries where girls are not discriminated against in the educational 
system, there appears to be an even stronger correlation between general education and 
economic growth.    
Together with the increased emphasis on human rather that physical resources, modern 
growth theory has also directed attention to a number of institutional and socio-political 
factors which may accelerate - or decelerate - the growth process. In particular, the role of 
sound governance has received increased attention. In most interpretations, sound 
governance must include proper macroeconomic management and a coherent and 
enforceable legal framework establishing the rules of the game of the economy. In recent 
years, catchwords like transparency, predictability, accountability, and others have also been 
rising to prominence in the development debate.    
Stimulated and enriched by disciplines outside mainstream economics, the role of 
institutions and of civic society has become increasingly acknowledged by development 
economists. Influential economists such as the Nobel prize laureate Douglas North have 
provided an analytical framework in which the gradual emergence of efficient institutions, 
rather than investment in machinery and equipment, is regarded as the key to development. 
In this neo-institutional approach, capital formation can be seen as the effect of 
development rather than its cause: good institutions come first, while savings and productive 
investments follow.    
Others, like Robert Putman, have stressed the role of a strong civil society as a factor 
underpinning sustainable economic growth. The essence of civic engagement is that it is 
based on voluntary participation and horizontal interaction, and networks of civic 
engagement - whether in sports clubs, neighborhood associations, trade unions or other 
grassroots organisations - are key components of social capital. "The denser such networks 
in a community", comments Putnam in his already classical work on the role of social capital 
in Italy’s economic development, (1993, p. 173), "the more likely that its citizens will be able 
to cooperate for mutual benefit".    
It is still too early to attempt a synthesis of the "new theory of growth and development" 
which appears to be emerging. The trend is clear, however: a more multidisciplinary 
approach to development is gaining ground, signifying, among other things, more emphasis on people, ideas and institutions, and less on money and factories. A reformulation of the 
role of capital is a convenient starting point.  
Part of a society’s capital is easily visible: factories, roads, schools, hospitals, universities, 
telecommunications, etc. But there may also be other, less tangible, forms of capital that 
constitute a crucial complement to physical and infrastructural capital: parliamentary 
democracy, a free press, respect for human rights, norms for social interaction, systems for 
rapid dissemination of new ideas, trade unions and a myriad of other large or small social 
organisations, a judiciary system which, by and large, defends law and justice, etc. This latter 
form of capital may be called institutional or social capital (the latter will be used in this 
paper to include institutional capital).    
Following the distinctions made above, a society’s total capital can be divided into different 
categories. Apart from natural capital (arable land, mineral resources, etc.) we have financial 
capital, that can be used to consume or invest. We have directly productive capital: 
machinery and equipment, etc. We also have infrastructural capital, and human capital. 
Finally, we have norms, institutions, networks, organisations, traditions and attitudes which 
together constitute a society’s social capital.    
To be rich in social capital can be seen as an end in itself - such a society is, by all criteria, 
more pleasant to live in than a society where the social capital is weak, or eroding. Social 
capital can also be regarded as a means, as social capital makes the use of other forms of 
capital both more equitable and efficient. Transaction costs are drastically reduced when 
people trust each other, when contracts are enforced, when the legal system is honest and 
when economic policies are predictable.    
If we return to Sweden we may, after this brief digression, interpret Swedish economic 
history between 1870 and 1970 in a slightly different light. Without downgrading the role 
traditionally assigned to iron ore, timber and technological innovations, a discussion about 
political and institutional aspects may lead to the conclusion that Sweden can be regarded as 
a country with a very fortunate combination, or balance, of various forms of capital 
necessary for economic and social development.    
As indicated earlier, the booming export sector based on Sweden's natural resources served 
to finance massive infrastructural and social investments already in the late 19
th century, in 
addition to financing directly productive investments and technological innovations. 
Through taxes and other measures, Sweden's natural capital was thus transformed into other 
forms of capital, rather than being dissipated in the form of rents. One important reason 
behind this development was the growing strength of the Swedish labour movement, and of 
a large number of voluntary associations and grassroots organisations which reinforced 
popular participation. In most cases, these organisations served as "school in democracy", 
and many also acted as strong pressure groups in favour of social justice, symbolized by the 
non-excluding character of the social services offered, and financed, by the public sector.    
The spectacular progress in primary education in the late 19
th century - for both boys and 
girls - with adult illiteracy virtually eliminated, deserves to be stressed in particular. By all international standards, Sweden was, at the turn of the century, a country with a very well 
developed human capital base.  
The public administration, traditionally characterised by honesty and a sense of working for 
the public good, appears to have made rather good use of most of the tax money.  
Domestic political and social developments also greatly facilitated the accumulation of other 
forms of capital, such as good institutions and a strong, active and responsible civil society.  
Socio-political and institutional development in Sweden    
At the political level, Sweden since 1870 must be regarded as one of the least dramatic and 
violent countries in the world. Major political events - such as the dissolution of the union 
with Norway in 1905, and the transition to parliamentary democracy during the first two 
decades of the 20
th century - took place after heated debates, and the struggle for political 
democracy and universal franchise was accompanied by street demonstrations, political 
strikes and political repression. Still, bloodshed was minimal, and the number of political 
prisoners easily counted.    
The crisis programme of the Social Democratic Party in the 1930s was subject to scathing 
criticism from the right-wing opponents, and the Social Democrats were forced - not too 
reluctantly - to abandon their nationalisation plans, but the basic concept of the welfare state 
gained widespread acceptance. Also, the subsequent rise to political hegemony of the Social 
Democrats in Swedish party politics signified that extremist movements to the left and to the 
right remained marginalised.    
To this picture of relative tranquility in domestic politics may be added that Sweden - with a 
successful combination of skill, luck and opportunism - has managed to avoid wars ever 
since 1809, when Sweden was defeated by Russia and forced to surrender Finland after a 
short war.    
Sweden’s political stability has, by and large, been matched by a remarkable stability as 
regards the basic "rules of the game" of economic management. While the conflict between 
the Social Democratic Party’s socialist ambitions and inclination towards state interventions, 
on the one hand, and the liberal and conservative parties' basic trust in a free market 
economy on the other has been present ever since the 1890s, and often given rise to virulent 
polemics, the threat of nationalisations has never been credible enough to stop the Swedish 
bourgeoisie from investing. And even those who were more afraid than they had reason to 
be had few alternatives, given the rather strict regulations against capital exports that were in 
force until quite recently.    
The major political issue in the 1950s was the question of compulsory pension for all 
employees. For the Social Democrats, it was a matter of principle to make the pension 
system non-excluding and compulsory, and the reform was labeled the most important 
reform during the entire century. The center-right opposition, on the other hand, fought the 
proposal energetically, arguing that state control over the huge pension funds that were to be accumulated would signify a step towards socialism. In 1959, the bill was finally enacted, and 
was eventually accepted by all major political parties during the 1960s and 1970s.    
The Social Democrats have consistently pursued an open trade policy. Sweden's traditionally 
heavy dependence upon foreign trade has, by and large, served to prevent protectionist 
experiments; in this respect, there has been a broad consensus among all major political 
parties.    
With the exception for a few periods, Swedish macroeconomic management was 
characterised by stability (until the 1970s). Most of the business cycles were imported, and 
although Sweden, as a small, open economy, was and remains highly dependent upon 
external economic developments, the impact of international economic downturns was 
rather shortlived. Even the "booms" were generally handled with prudence; somewhat 
schematically, one could say that Sweden managed to take advantage of favourable external 
economic developments and convert these into sustainable domestic development. On 
several occasions, Sweden simply benefited from good luck.    
The various Social Democratic governments which ruled without interruption in the 1930s, 
40s, 50s and 60s—at times, in coalition with the Farmers' Party—were characterised by a 
firm belief in the importance of fiscal discipline, restrictive monetary policies, and a low rate 
of interest. The rate of interest was strictly regulated, and large amounts of credit were 
channelled to priority areas, mainly house building. In a situation of full employment, rapid 
economic growth and a long-lasting boom in the construction sector, the government felt 
compelled to extend credit market regulations in several steps, and it was not until the 1980s 
that the credit market began to be deregulated again (for a discussion, see, for example, 
Davis and Henrekson, 1995).    
While the Farmers' Party was willing to compromise on a number of issues, they were always 
unconditional in their demand for a policy based on low interest rates.    
Another cornerstone of the "Swedish model" was the largely successful attempt to combine 
fiscal restraint with an active labour market policy. In order to make the labour market more 
flexible, reduce open unemployment and accelerate the restructuring of the economy, 
generous allowances were granted workers who became redundant and accepted to undergo 
retraining, or to move to other sectors or geographical regions. Thus, while the lowering of 
general demand pressure would create pockets of unemployment in stagnating sectors, these 
problems should be solved by selective measures designed to either create new jobs or to 
reallocate manpower – often, after vocational training – to expanding sectors and firms (a 
good discussion is found in Bergström, 1992)    
One conclusion from this brief overview is that one prerequisite for sustained economic 
development—a minimum of political stability, sound governance, macroeconomic 
responsibility, and accountability to the citizens—was met during most of the period. We 
may also add that the legal and institutional framework that developed proved highly 
beneficial for economic development.    While it would be an exaggeration to call the relationship between all major actors—trade 
unions, employers, government, political parties, and others—consistently harmonious, there 
developed a high degree of consensus and mutual understanding between the different 
interest groups. The basic concepts of the welfare state were accepted by almost all, as were 
state interventions to a number of key institutions and activities in support of economic 
development (such as research, higher education, basic infrastructure, an active labour 
market policy, and others).    
In this context, the co-operative atmosphere that for many decades characterised relations 
between the central trade union for blue-collar workers, Landsorganisationen (LO, founded 
in 1898), and the Swedish Employers Federation (SAF) deserves to be stressed in particular. 
The extremely high degree, by international standards, of unionisation of the Swedish labour 
force—traditionally, well over 80 per cent of all Swedish wage Barnes belong to a trade 
union—contributed to give the unions a high degree of legitimacy and responsibility. For 
many decades, between the late 1930s and until quite recently, the Swedish labour market 
was characterised by a few strong labour markets organisations which acted under great 
freedom without government interventions, and with credible and effective institutions 
capable of solving threatening conflicts with peaceful compromises. Major strikes or 
lockouts were, and are, infrequent.    
The fact that unemployment remained insignificant all through the 1940s and 1950s (and 
1960s) made it possible to make organised labour accept even rather harsh measures, such as 
rapid industrial rationalisation and mechanisation, fiscal discipline, and a labour market 
policy which forced workers to move from stagnating to expanding sectors and regions.  
Compared to many other countries (England, for example) Swedish trade unions have had a 
consistently favourable attitude towards technological progress, even when employment has 
temporarily suffered. As early as in the 1920s, for example, the central trade union, LO, 
declared the following "Trade unions should promote the planned development of industry, 
its structural rationalisation into larger units, the financial reorganisation, and the substitution 
of old machinery and methods by new plants and innovations." (quoted by Hjalmarsson, 
1991, p. 254). While this and similar views may have reflected a remaining legacy of Marxist 
thought (Swedish Social Democracy has fully embraced only one aspect of Marxism: an 
enthusiastic belief in technological progress and in large-scale enterprises) it was not difficult 
to reconcile this position with that of the major industrialists.    
The comparatively harmonious relations between the few and centralised labour market 
organisations since the late 1930s may be used to illustrate a general characteristic of Swedish 
society: an ability to resolve social and economic conflicts in a way that does not give rise to 
"winners", "loses" and lasting bitterness. Strong and responsible civil organisations, and a 
comparatively equal distribution of income, are other factors which may explain the 
remarkable social peace that accompanied Sweden's transformation from a poor, agrarian 
economy to a highly developed industrial nation in a rather short period of time.  
It should also be stressed that as a proxy for the existence of social capital in Sweden, we 
may mention the active participation of people in a wide variety of civic associations sports 
clubs, temperance societies, study circles, charity organisations, political and religious organisations, parents' associations, consumer co-operatives, farmers unions, cultural 
associations, birdwatchers associations, etc. All such organisations have, as indicated earlier, 
longstanding traditions in the Swedish society. Although good data on membership in civic 
associations from earlier times is scant, as an indicator of the massive involvement by the 
Swedish people in civic organisations, it may be mentioned that in 1992, every adult Swede 
was a member of 2.9 different associations, on average. 51 per cent of the population 
regarded themselves as "active" in one or several associations, and 29 per cent held some 
kind of elected position (Source: Statistics Sweden, Society Activities in Sweden - a Statistical 
Illustration, 1993)    
A traditional Swedish institution which has been copied in several other countries, the 
ombudsman, with the duty to investigate citizens' complaints of bureaucratic abuse, can also 
serve to illustrate one aspect of civil society's control of the rulers. The ombudsman office 
originated as early as 1810, and his scope of authority covers all government institutions and 
agencies. The ombudsman is supposed to be an independent, impartial arbiter between 
government and the individual, and although his power is solely recommendatory, the 
institution carries considerable prestige, and has contributed to make public administration 
more accountable to the citizens.    
As for human capital, universal and obligatory primary education was, as indicated earlier, a 
goal already in 1842. As the tax base increased towards the end of the 19th century, more 
and more resources were devoted to education, and higher education expanded rapidly. The 
accumulation of human capital and of skill-intensive industrial production went hand in 
hand; while demand for skilled labour increased continuously, a flexible educational system, 
not least a large number of vocational schools, guaranteed the supply.    
The development of health indicators in 1930-60 also stands out as highly positive.    
   
Table I.7. Demographic Trends and Health Indicators, Sweden 1930-60    
   
   1931-40 1941-501951-
60
Annual rate of  Population  0.37 1.00 6.30
Birth rate (per 1,000)  14.45 18.4614.70
Death rate (per 1,000 live births)  11.67 10.44 9.68
Infant mortality (0-1 years) Per 1,000 live births  46 28 18
Life expectancy at birth         
  Males   64 68 71
  Females  66 71 74
Source: Same as Table I.3.    
Sweden 1930-60: Concluding remarks    The dramatic progress made in human development in 1930-60 was financed by large 
increases in public expenditures on health, education and other social services, and by a high 
and accelerating rate of economic growth. Contrary to many other countries experiencing 
rapid growth, Sweden was remarkably successful in combining growth with equity, mainly as 
a result of three circumstances:    
An obligatory and free primary education system which guaranteed a decent 
educational level for all;  
All through the 1940s and 1950s, Sweden managed to maintain full, or near full, 
employment;  
The progressive tax system, in combination with a general welfare system and 
targeted support to the most needy, resulted in a substantial redistribution of income, 
and in a safety net for particularly vulnerable groups. 
To summarise, balance appears to be a word that covers several aspects of Swedish 
developments 1930-60. The balance achieved between different forms of capital—natural 
capital, financial capital, infrastructural capital, directly productive capital, human capital and 
social capita - proved highly beneficial for both economic growth and human development 
Despite the political hegemony exercised by the Social Democrats during the entire period, 
the spirit of the ombudsman and a strong civil society served to safeguard a pluralistic 
society, and to guarantee that accountability was exercised "from below".  
  